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Casenote
ONE FOR TWENTY-FIVE: THE FEDERAL COURTS REVERSE A
DECISION OF THE NFL'S DISABILITY BOARD FOR
THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1993 IN JANI V
BERT BELL/PETE RO7ELLE NFL
PLAYER RETIREMENT PLAA n
"They're gladiators. When the game is over, these guys have
to go home. And when it's over, a lot of them don't have a home
to go to. "2
I. INTRODUCTION
It was impossible to miss Mike Webster on the football field.3
The six-foot, one-inch, 255-pound center, nicknamed "Iron Mike,"
anchored four Pittsburgh Steelers Super Bowl teams. 4 Upon retir-
ing in 1990, however, he fell into obscurity. Brain damage, caused
by numerous head injuries suffered during his playing career, led
to depression, failed business ventures, an arrest, and periods of
homelessness. 5
1. No. Civ. WDQ-04-1606, 2005 WL 1115250 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2005), affd, 209
F. App'x 305 (4th Cir. 2006).
2. Greg Garber, A Tormented Soul, ESPN.coM, Jan. 24, 2005, http://sports.
espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1972285 [hereinafter Garber, A Tormented Soul]
(quoting Webster's ex-wife).
3. See Mike Webster, Member - Pro Football Hall of Fame, http://www.pro
footballhof.com/hof/member.jsp?playerIid=227 (last visited Nov. 13, 2007) (sum-
marizing Webster's National Football League ("NFL") career). Webster was
drafted by the Pittsburgh Steelers in the fifth round of the 1974 draft. See id. He
played fifteen seasons for the Pittsburgh Steelers and started every game for ten
consecutive seasons. See id. In 1997, he was elected to the Pro Football Hall of
Fame. See id.
4. See Mike Webster, Achievements Timeline, http://www.mikewebster52.
com/achievements/achievements2.html (on file with author) (providing year-by-
year list of Webster's NFL accomplishments).
5. SeeGreg Garber, Wandering Through the Fog, ESPN.coM,Jan. 27, 2005, http:/
/sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1972288 [hereinafter Garber, Wandering]
(detailing Webster's post-NFL personal and public troubles); see also Chuck Finder,
1
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In 1999 Webster applied for disability benefits under the Na-
tional Football League's ("NFL") current Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle
NFL Player Retirement Plan ("Plan"). 6 The NFL Retirement Board
("Board"), which administers the Plan, agreed that Webster was dis-
abled from playing in the NFL, but it disagreed that Webster's con-
dition permitted him to receive the highest level of benefits
available to former players. 7 Webster filed multiple appeals over
the next few years. In 2003, the Board issued its final decision,
which affirmed its original benefits determination. 8 Webster, how-
ever, was unable to hear this decision, having succumbed to a heart
attack the year before at the age of fifty.9 His estate, dissatisfied
with the Board's final ruling, filed suit in federal court.10 The re-
sult: a reversal of the Board's decision, upheld by the Fourth Cir-
cuit, marking the first time a federal appeals court found the Board
abused its discretion under the highly deferential abuse of discre-
tion standard of review. 1
From a legal perspective, Webster's case illustrates two reasons
why courts are reluctant to overturn Board decisions except under
rare circumstances. First, the Board is considered a fiduciary under
the Plan's language and, therefore, its decisions are subject to the
highly deferential abuse of discretion standard of review. 12 The sec-
The Blame: It Falls on NFL, Not the Rooneys, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAZETE, March 13,
2005, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05072/470866.stm (stating
Dan Rooney, former Steelers president, got Webster room at Hilton in Pittsburgh
for three months after he heard Webster was sleeping at local Amtrak station).
6. See NFL Players Association, http://www.nflpa.org (last visited Nov. 13,
2007) (providing resources for former NFL players including retirement and disa-
bility information).
7. See Jani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, No. Civ.
WDQ-04-1606, 2005 WL 1115250, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2005) (stating NFL Retire-
ment Board awarded Webster Football Degenerative Benefits, not Active Football
Disability Benefits), affd, 209 F. App'x 305 (4th Cir. 2006).
8. SeeJani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 209 F. App'x
305,312-13 (4th Cir. 2006) (awarding Webster lower level of benefits).
9. See Greg Garber, Sifting Through the Ashes, ESPN.coM,Jan. 28, 2005, http://
sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1972289 [hereinafter Garber, Sifting] (not-
ing date and cause of Webster's death).
10. SeeJani, 2005 WL 1115250, at *4 (following Board's final decision, Web-
ster's estate filed suit in federal court).
11. See Larry O'Dell, Former NFL Player's Estate Wins Disability Benefits, INS. J.,
Dec. 18, 2006, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2006/12/18/
75120.htm (reporting Fourth Circuit unanimously upheld district court decision
to pay Webster's estate over $1.5 million in disability benefits).
12. SeeJohnson v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 468
F.3d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 2006) (restating abuse of discretion is proper standard of
review for Board decisions); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187
(1959) (defining appropriate standard of review when discretion is conferred on
trustee).
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ond, related, reason is the presence of conflicting medical evidence
in many disability benefits cases.' 3 Disability benefit awards often
hinge on medical testimony. Courts have consistently stated that
the Board does not have to follow the opinion of the majority of
doctors, but only needs to make a determination based on "substan-
tial evidence," which can be the opinion of just one doctor. 14
Although the opinion remains unpublished, Webster's case is
important to retired NFL players because it has generated signifi-
cant publicity on this important matter.15 Recently, numerous for-
mer players, coaches, and other disgruntled representatives went to
Capitol Hill to voice their criticisms regarding the actions of the
Board and the National Football League Players Association
("NFLPA"). Their grievance was that the NFL's behavior borders
on neglect towards former players who helped to elevate the NFL to
its present level of success. 16 The facts of Webster's case support
this criticism; the Board ignored unanimous medical evidence stat-
ing that Webster's disability was present at the time he retired from
the NFL.' 7 In defense of its actions, the NFL has countered that
football is a violent sport, players choose to participate, and the
league has made substantial efforts to compensate disabled and re-
tired players. ' 8
13. SeeJohn Barr & Arty Berko, Fighting for Benefits, ESPN.coM, Feb. 8, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?id=2760591 &lpos=spotlight&lid=
tab2pos2 (listing conflicting medical opinions regarding cause of former NFL
player Brent Boyd's mental disability to exemplify this point).
14. See Jani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 209, F.
App'x 305, 313-14 (4th Cir. 2006) ("The Board's discretion, however, is not unfet-
tered. Its exercise must be supported by substantial evidence.") (citing Bernstein
v. CapitalCare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 788 (4th Cir. 1995)).
15. See Greg Garber, Family, Friends React to Webster Ruling, ESPN.coM, Dec. 15,
2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2697538&type=story [hereinafter
Garber, Family, Friends React] (explaining Webster's suit as victory for all players
asking NFL for benefits).
16. See John P. Lopez, Pre-1977 NFL Players Fight for Better Pension, Hous.
CHRON., Oct. 7, 2006 at 11, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/
archive.mpl?id=2006_4205982 ("These were the guys who put the NFL on the map
and made it the game it is today[.]").
17. SeeJani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, No. Civ.
WDQ-04-1606, 2005 WL 1115250, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2005) (summarizing that
every examining doctor concluded that Webster's disability was present when he
retired), affd, 209 F. App'x 305 (4th Cir. 2006).
18. See Chuck Finder, Webster vs. NFL: A Family's Fight, Attorney is a Staunch
Defender of the Plan, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, March, 14, 2005, at D1 [hereinafter
Finder, Webster v. NFL] (presenting other side of debate defending NFL's Plan).
Doug Ell, lawyer and administrator of the Plan, explains that the NFL will be una-
ble to keep all retired players happy. See id. (defending Plan to critics). He goes
on to state that the Plan pays out over $1 million in disability benefits per month.
See id. (noting that Plan still does much for retired players).
2008]
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This Casenote uses Jani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retire-
ment Plan to explore issues surrounding retired players seeking disa-
bility benefits under the Plan.' 9 Part II provides background on
obstacles former NFL players face after their playing days, the pro-
cedure for applying for disability benefits, and a summary of se-
lected suits filed by former players under the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). 2 0 Part III
briefly summarizes the courts' analyses in Webster's case.2 ' Part IV
takes a closer look at limitations of the abuse of discretion standard
of review used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit ("Fourth Circuit") in this case.2 2 Part V provides a summary
of the ongoing debate between former players and the NFL regard-
ing disability benefits. 23 Finally, Part VI concludes that one solution
to the problem may involve current players voicing former players'
concerns to the NFL in the next round of collective bargaining
agreement negotiations. 24 Part VII was added as a Postscript to
highlight the NFLPA's recent initiatives in response to the public
criticism over how it has previously administered disability benefits
for former players. 25
II. BACKGROUND
A. Retirement: Adjusting to Life After Football
Players exiting the NFL often face a variety of difficulties in
adjusting to life after football, and Mike Webster was no different.
NFL players are accustomed to inflated salaries and an almost ce-
lebrity status, making transition into life as a somewhat anonymous
19. See Sweeney v. Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan, 961 F. Supp. 1381,
1383 (S.D. Cal. 1997) ("The Plans are employee benefit plans covered by the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.. . ."), affd in part, rev'd in part, 156
F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 1998).
20. For a further discussion of the background of this Casenote, see infra
notes 25-125 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the reasons why the district court reversed the
Board's decision, see infra notes 126-39 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of two limitations the Fourth Circuit imposed on
the Board in Jani, see infra notes 141-59 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of the debate over benefits from both a former
player's perspective and the Board's perspective, see infra notes 160-83 and accom-
panying text.
24. For a further discussion of the conclusion of the Casenote and its prompt
to current players, see infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
25. For a further discussion of what the NFLPA has done to counteract this
criticism, see infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
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person difficult.26 In addition, players are accustomed to living a
very structured life while playing football; coaches are always telling
players where to be and what to do, with team assistants handling
many non-football related tasks.27 Once out of the league, most
players often find themselves on their own and required to find a
job in corporate America. 28 Further, many former players must
deal with injuries suffered during their playing days. 29 While the
number of players experiencing injuries may be alarming, it is not
surprising given that football is a physical and violent contact
sport.30
26. See Greg Garber, Man on the Moon, ESPN.coM, Jan. 26, 2005, http://
sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1972287 [hereinafter Garber, Man on the
Moon] (commenting on why many football players struggle adjusting to life post-
football).
To be a physical specimen of the head-turning order, to make vastly more
money than ordinary people do and to live an appropriately out-sized
lifestyle, to play in arenas filled with 60,000 adoring fanatics, to exist in an
environment where people want to name their children after you - well,
that can skew even a healthy sense of perspective.
Id.
27. See id. (explaining professional athletes live very structured lives). Web-
ster's ex-wife, Pam, states she heard over sixty percent of marriages involving ex-
football players fail due, in part, to the lack of structure for players once they re-
tire. See id.
28. See Greg Garber, Developing a New Game Plan, ESPN.coM, Jan. 27, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1 975331 (describing program cre-
ated by former NFL player to assist players' adjustment to life after football).
Stacey Robinson, former New York Giant and the NFLPA's director of player devel-
opment, works with ex-NFL players to smooth the transition into the world beyond
the football field. See id. For example, the NFLPA provides continuing education
programs and career internships. See id. The NFLPA will also reimburse a player's
tuition if he completes an undergraduate or master's degree. See id. Former ath-
letes also have internet resources to aid their transition. See, e.g., GamesOver.org,
http://www.gamesover.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2007) (creating online resource
for ex-athletes attempting to adjust to life after sports).
29. See Greg Logan, It's a Risky Business Football's Violence Often fakes a Late Toll
on Players in the Form Of Long-Term Disability and - According to Some Studies - Prema-
ture Death, NEWSDAY, Sept. 4, 1988, at 4 (providing findings from study of 700 for-
mer players by Ron Mix, former player and lawyer). An estimated fifty-one percent
of pre-1970 players and sixty-six percent of post-1970 players have a permanent
injury. See id. A 2001 study of retired NFL players by the Center for the Study of
Retired Athletes at the University of North Carolina found that eighty-seven per-
cent of players polled stated they suffered from depression and forty-six percent
said they were taking anti-depressant medication. See Greg Garber, A Game of
Mortals, ESPN.coM, Jan. 24, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=
1973574 (discussing results from 2001 study of former players). Another study,
however, conducted in 1994 by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health ("NIOSH") found that football players live marginally longer lives than
non-football players. See id. (explaining study was prompted by NFLPA). The NI-
OSH study also found, however, that offensive and defensive linemen had a six-
times greater risk of heart disease as compared to men of normal size. See id.
30. See Chuck Finder, NFL 's Disability Plan Puts Former Players Under Close Scru-
tiny, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, March 14, 2005, at D4 [hereinafter Finder, NFL's
2008]
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1. Webster's Failed Business Ventures and Financial Woes
When Webster's retirement began in 1990, it seemed pleasant
and filled with opportunity. He had invested wisely during his play-
ing days and even considered pursuing careers in football and in
non-football related areas, such as the business and medical fields.3 1
After a brief two-game stint as an NBC broadcaster, Webster and his
family moved to his wife's hometown of Lodi, Wisconsin. 32 Finan-
cial troubles began at this point: Webster allowed bills to pile up,
stopped filing tax returns, and delved into his retirement savings. 33
Webster's financial woes worsened over the next ten years. In
1999, when Webster applied for disability benefits, the Board em-
ployed a private investigator to explore Webster's financial back-
ground. 34 The investigator compiled a report on Webster which
was full of numerous bad business judgments and failed attempts at
seeking employment.35 After 1994, Webster's only source of in-
come was money earned from autographing memorabilia. 36 Web-
ster was also involved in a few lawsuits, 37 forcing him to use his four
Super Bowl rings as collateral. 38 In addition, Webster became
Disability Plan] (acknowledging drawing lines for which players should be compen-
sated for their injuries is difficult). Of the more than 3,500 NFLPA members, an
estimated 232 receive disability benefits. See Finder, Webster v. NFL, supra note 18
(explaining of 232 members receiving benefits, 104 receive partial benefits and
128 receive full disability).
31. See Garber, Man on the Moon, supra note 26 (showing Webster seemed opti-
mistic about his opportunities when he first retired in 1991). Webster considered
becoming a coach, chiropractor, or stockbroker. See id.
32. See id. (marking beginning of Webster's downward spiral). In 1991, Web-
ster announced two preseason games on NBC and was offered a contract, however,
Webster declined the offer because of the move. See id.
33. See id. (noting contrast in Webster's mental state before and after retire-
ment). Webster went from knowing the tax laws in every state to not paying in-
come taxes for the last eleven years of his life. See id. The bank foreclosed on his
house within eighteen months after he moved his family to Lodi, Wisconsin. See id.
34. See id. (stating Board hired Thomas A. Keating, investigator, to explore
Webster's financial background).
35. See id. (providing list of Webster's failed business ventures). Webster
formed and was involved in numerous business ventures that failed including Web-
ster Asset Management Trust, funded with a $230,000 capital contribution from
Webster. See id.
36. See Garber, Wandering, supra note 5 (explaining Webster's friend, Sunny
Jani, would book Webster at Pittsburgh area autograph shows).
37. See Garber, Sifting, supra note 9 (noting recent settlement of lawsuit involv-
ing Webster's former business partner); see also Finder, Webster v. NFL, supra note
18 (explaining Webster's other legal troubles). In April 2003, a couple won a civil
lawsuit against Webster resulting from an earlier car accident. See id. As of 2005,
Webster's estate also owed over $250,000 in back taxes to the IRS. See id.
38. See Garber, Family, Fiends React, supra note 15 (explaining part of disabil-
ity award will be used to recover Webster's four Super Bowl rings and Pro Football
Hall of Fame ring which are being held by attorney as collateral). The rings were
[Vol. 15: p. I
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homeless for the last years of his life and was forced to sleep in his
car, motels, or at friends' houses. 39
2. Injuries Take Their Toll on 'Iron Mike'
At the time of Webster's retirement, his knees and right shoul-
der were permanently ruined and he suffered from constant head-
aches. 40 These headaches worsened in intensity and frequency
after his retirement.41 Webster took a variety of pain medications
to combat these symptoms, paid for them out of his own pocket,
and sometimes out of sheer desperation used a taser gun on him-
self to fall asleep. 42 In 1996, a psychiatrist examined Webster and
reported that Webster suffered from despair, constantly thought
about suicide, and noted that Webster confessed to spending days
curled up in the fetal position.43 When Webster applied for disabil-
used as collateral to post $2,000 bail after Webster's arrest for forging prescriptions
for Ritalin. See Garber, Wandering, supra note 5.
39. See Garber, Wandering, supra note 5 (detailing Webster's extended periods
of homelessness during final years of his life); see also Garber, Man on the Moon,
supra note 26 (reporting Webster would sleep "wherever it was warm and people
wouldn't disturb him . . ").
40. See Greg Garber, Blood and Guts, ESPN.coM, Jan. 25, 2005, http://sports.
espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1972286 (providing partial list of Webster's inju-
ries). Webster broke almost all of his fingers and suffered permanent damage to
five vertebrae. See id. After an MRI a physician asked Webster if he had ever been
in a car accident because he showed similar symptoms to a person in that condi-
tion. See id. It is estimated that Webster suffered 25,000 violent collisions during
his career. See id. Although Webster never reported nor was never treated for any
concussions, doctors estimate Webster sustained multiple concussions. See id. An-
other ex-Pittsburgh Steeler, Merril Hoge, won a successful lawsuit against a Chi-
cago Bears team physician for failing to warn him about the dangers of
concussions and negligently allowing Hoge to continue playing without an ade-
quate follow-up examination. See Alexander N. Hecht, Legal and Ethical Aspects of
Sports-Related Concussions: The Merril Hoge Story, 12 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 17, 25-
30 (2002) (exploring sports-related concussion litigation through scope of Hoge's
case).
41. See Garber, Wandering, supra note 5 (describing his headaches to physi-
cian, Webster said they were "blowing the top of [my] head off'). Webster was
particularly susceptible to being hit in the head by opposing teams because of the
"head slap." SeeJani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, No.
Civ. WDQ-04-1606, 2005 WL 1115250, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2005) (defining
"head slap"), afrd, 209 F. App'x 305 (4th Cir. 2006). Defensive linemen would
start their rush by slapping the center on the top of his head while he was still
bending over to hike the ball in an effort to disorient him. See id. The NFL
banned this technique in 1977, however, numerous defensive players continued to
use the "head slap." See id.
42. See Garber, A Tormented Soul, supra note 2 (explaining that use of taser gun
on himself was sometimes only way Webster could escape pain and fall asleep).
43. See Garber, Man on the Moon, supra note 26 (paraphrasing diagnosis of Dr.
Jerry Carter). Dr. Carter examined Webster in 1996 and produced a comprehen-
sive psychological profile on Webster. See id. Former teammates prompted Web-
ster to be evaluated after they found him sleeping in a train station. SeeJani v. Bert
2008]
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ity benefits he was examined by multiple doctors who concluded
that he suffered brain damage from playing football.44 Webster ul-
timately passed away on September 24, 2002, from a heart attack.45
B. The NFL Retirement Plan
The current Plan is a product of the 1993 collective bargaining
agreement between the National Football League Management
Council ("NFLMC") and the NFLPA, which merged the then-ex-
isting Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan into the current Plan.
46
In addition, a new Supplemental Disability Plan was established. 47
Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 209 F. App'x 305, 310 (4th Cir.
2006).
44. SeeJani, 209 F. App'x at 310-11 (summarizing medical opinions of examin-
ing physicians). Dr. Vodvarka examined Webster in late 1997 and concluded he
might be suffering from post-concussion syndrome. See id. at 310. Dr. Krieg, a
psychologist examined Webster and stated he suffered from brain damage - "de-
mentia resulting from his football-related head traumas." See id. Further, Dr. Him-
melhoch stated that Webster suffered from encephalopathy. See id. at 311. A
recent study by the University of North Carolina's Center for the Study of Retired
Athletes determined that the rate of diagnosed clinical depression is closely corre-
lated with the number of concussions sustained by an NFL player. See Alan
Schwarz, Concussions Tied to Depression in Ex-N.F.L. Players, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31 /sports/football/31concussions.html [here-
inafter Schwarz, Concussions] (discussing results of recent study which examined
effects of concussions on retired players). The study found that 20.2 percent of
595 players who sustained three of more concussions while playing football suf-
fered from depression. See id. Meanwhile, the NFL has continued to discredit any
link between head injuries and depression. See id.
45. See Garber, A Tormented Soul, supra note 2 (noting Webster passed away
from heart failure at age of fifty). Although a 1994 study by NIOSH stated that
NFL players live marginally longer than non-football players, more recent studies
suggest the average life expectancy of NFL players is fifty-five and that linemen
have a life expectancy closer to fifty-two. See Joanne Korth, A Huge Problem, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES,Jan. 29, 2006 at IC, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2006/
01/29/Sports/A~huge-problem.shtml (suggesting life expectancies of former
NFL players are shorter than previous studies have indicated). The life expectancy
of a NFL player is significantly below 77.6 years, the life expectancy of the average
American person. See id.
46. See Sweeney v. Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan, 961 F. Supp. 1381,
1383 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (chronicling history of Plan), affd in part, rev'd in part, 156
F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 1998). The Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan was estab-
lished in 1962. See id. The Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan was estab-
lished in 1989. See id. The two plans were merged into the current Plan in 1994.
See id. For an in-depth history of the NFL's retirement plan see NATIONAL FOOT-
BALL LEAGUE PLAYERs ASSOCIATION, HISToRy OF RETIREMENT AND T&P BENEFITS FOR
NFL PLAYERS (2006), http://www.nflpa.org/pdfs/NewsAndEvents/History-ofjthe
_NFLPA'sRetiredPlayer Benefits.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2007).
47. See Sweeney, 961 F. Supp. at 1383 (explaining establishment of Supplemen-
tal Disability Plan during 1993 CBA). Internal Revenue Service regulations re-
quired the NFL to establish the Supplemental Disability Plan because the existing
Plan could not offer all of the increased benefits stemming from the 1993 CBA.
See Dial v. NFL Player Supplemental Disability Plan, 174 F.3d 606, 609 (5th Cir.
1999) (explaining why Supplemental Plan was established). The Supplemental
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All NFL players are automatically enrolled in the Plan which pro-
vides them with a pension and disability benefits. 48 This section
summarizes how the Plan defines injuries, explains the process for
applying for disabilities, and concludes with a recap of Webster's
applications for disability.
1. Definition of an Injury Under the Plan
The Plan provides for a variety of disability benefits including
Line of Duty Benefits and Total and Permanent Benefits. 49 Total
and Permanent Benefits are broken into four categories: Active
Football, Active Non-football, Football Degenerative, and Inac-
tive. 50 To qualify for these benefits a player must suffer from a total
and permanent disability ("T&P disability") as defined by the
Plan. 51 The requirement that the disability prevents a player from
engaging in any type of employment is central to the definition of
T&P disability.52 Also, in order for a player to qualify for these ben-
efits, the player must suffer the T&P disability "shortly after" the
disability first arose; another term defined in the Plan.5 3 Therefore,
Disability Plan awards additional benefits to players that already qualify for benefits
under the Plan. See Sweeney, 961 F. Supp. at 1384.
48. SeeJani, 209 F. App'x at 306, n.1 (informing that NFL enrolls all players in
Plan and NFL Supplemental Disability Plan). A player's monthly pension is deter-
mined based on the number of years a player plays in the league. See NFL Players
Association - Rules and Regulations - Player Benefits, http://www.nflpa.org/Rules
AndRegs/PlayerBenefits.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2007) (providing formula for
calculating credits based on number of seasons played). A player earns a credit for
every year that he plays in at least three games during the season. See id. (noting
player can be on active list, injured active reserve list, or physically unable to per-
form/football list to earn these credits). Players are eligible to begin collecting a
pension at age fifty-five. See id.
49. See NFL Players Association - Rules and Regulations - Player Benefits,
supra note 48 (listing different types of benefits available to NFL players). The
most recent collective bargaining agreement initiated a Line of Duty Disability. See
id. Line of Duty Disability benefits compensate players that were forced to retire
from their injuries, however, the injuries do not classify the player as totally and
permanently disabled. Id.
50. See NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, NFLPA WHITE PA-
PER ON BENEFITS (2007), http://www.nflpa.org/whitepaper/NFLPAWhite_Paper.
pdf at 5-6 (providing definitions of four types of T&P disability benefits).
51. SeeJani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, No. Civ.
WDQ-04-1606, 2005 WL 1115250, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2005) (defining T&P
injury), affd, 209 F. App'x 305 (4th Cir. 2006). "A player will be deemed [to have a
T&P injury] if the Retirement Board finds that he has become totally disabled to
the extent that he is substantially prevented from or substantially unable to engage
in any occupation or employment for remuneration or profit." Id.
52. See id. (highlighting exception to lack of employment for disability pay-
ments). A player will not be considered employed if the player is employed by the
NFL or by any employer out of benevolence. See id.
53. SeeJani, 209 F. App'x at 309 (defining "shortly after" in Plan). The Plan
uses a three-tiered scheme of presumptions based on six-month increments. See id.
2008]
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medical and financial records become pivotal in the Board's deter-
mination of disability benefits.54
2. Applying for Disability Benefits
To apply for disability benefits, a player submits a written appli-
cation to the Disability Initial Claims Committee ("DICC").55 In ad-
dition, the player is examined by a Plan-neutral physician. 56 The
DICC then decides whether benefits should be awarded based on
the player's application and medical evaluation. 57 If the player's
disability claim is rejected or the player is unhappy with the DICC's
decision, the player may appeal the decision to the Board.58 The
Board consists of six members: three members representing the
owners and three members representing the players. 59 The Board,
as a fiduciary of the Plan, has "full power, authority and discretion
to interpret the Plans."60 An appeal to the Board requires a player
to undergo at least one additional medical examination by a Plan-
A player who becomes totally and permanently disabled no later than six
months after a disability(ies) first arises will be conclusively deemed to
have become totally and permanently disabled "shortly after" the disabil-
ity(ies) first arises, ... and a Player who becomes totally and permanently
disabled more than 12 months after a disability(ies) first arises will be
conclusively deemed not to have become totally and permanently dis-
abled "shortly after" the disability(ies) first arises.... In cases falling
within this six- to twelve-month period, the Retirement Board will have
the right and duty to determine whether the "shortly after" standard is
satisfied.
Id.
54. See id. at 310-11 (listings materials Webster submitted to Board including
post-retirement medical records and affidavit explaining that he had been unable
to work since retirement). See id.
55. See NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 50 at 7-8 (sending application to Plan
office in Baltimore, Maryland is first step in applying for benefits); see also Finder,
Webster v. NFL, supra note 18 (claiming many retired players are unaware disability
benefits even exist). Former players must file a disability claim within twelve years
of their final season or by age forty-five. See id.
56. See NFLPA WHIT PAPER, supra note 50 at 8 (requiring medical examina-
tion as part of application process). A written report is issued by the neutral physi-
cian which comments on a player's condition and his ability to work. See id.
57. See id. (describing role of Disability Initial Claims Committee). The Disa-
bility Initial Claims Committee ("DICC") is comprised of two members. See id.
One member is appointed by the NFLPA and the other member is appointed by
the NFL. See id.
58. See id. (outlining appeals process from decisions of DICC). If the DICC is
deadlocked on a decision, the player's disability claim will be denied and the
player may appeal to the Board. See id.
59. See id. (providing names and background on current Board members).
60. Sweeney v. Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan, 961 F. Supp. 1381, 1384
(D. Cal. 1997), affd in part, rev'd in part, 156 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 1998). The Board
conducts its own investigation and does not give deference to the DICC's decision.
See NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 50 AT 9 (reiterating autonomy of Board).
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neutral physician and will often require a player to submit financial
records to prove that the disability has prevented him from work-
ing. 61 The Board may also hire a private investigator to verify this
information. 62 If the Board is deadlocked on a decision, it can re-
fer the dispute to a Medical Advisory Physician ("MAP") whose
medical opinion of a player's condition will be binding on the
Board. 63 After conducting an independent review of a player's file,
the Board will issue a final determination stating whether a player is
entitled to receive benefits and, if so, what type of benefits will be
awarded.64 A player may file suit in federal court if he is still un-
happy with the Board's final determination. 65
3. Webster's Applications to the Board for Disabilities
Webster applied to the Board for disabilities in 1999.66 He ap-
plied for Active benefits and, in the alternative, Degenerative bene-
fits. 6 7 As part of his application, Webster submitted three medical
reports from different doctors claiming that he was T&P disabled as
a result of brain damage suffered while playing football. 68 Webster
also submitted financial information showing that he was unable to
perform any services while employed by the Kansas City Chiefs.69
61. See NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 50 AT 9 (stating medical examination
is required by federal law). See also Finder, Webster v. NFL, supra note 18 (placing
burden of proof on player). "It's a pretty high standard to reach: One can't hold
any meaningful employment." Id.
62. See Finder, Webster v. NFL, supra note 18 (explaining role of investigator).
An investigator is often hired to delve into a player's medical and financial records
and to verify that a player has not been employed. See id.
63. See Johnson v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 468
F.3d 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 2006) (defining role of Medical Advisory Physician
("MAP") in disability benefit determinations). For a discussion of the somewhat
unresolved issue of whether the Board must accept a MAP's determination of
whether a player is T&P disabled and the MAP's determined onset date for the
T&P disability, see infra note 181 and accompanying text.
64. See NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 50 at 8-9 (summarizing role of Board
in appeals process).
65. See id. at 9. For a further discussion of why players must file suit in federal
court, see infra note 79 and accompanying text.
66. See O'Dell, supra note 11 (noting first time Webster applied for benefits);
see also Garber, Wandering, supra note 5 (explaining Webster first considered apply-
ing for benefits in 1995, but never did so).
67. See Jani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 209 F.
App'x 305, 310 (4th Cir. 2006) (showing Webster's initial application listed both
types of benefits).
68. See id. at 310-11 (summarizing medical opinions of Dr. Krieg, Dr.
Vodvarka, and Dr. Himmelhoch). All three doctors concluded that Webster was
T&P disabled. See id.
69. See id. at 311 (quoting Webster explaining his inability to keep any type of
employment, even employment out of benevolence). But see Garber, Man on the
Moon, supra note 26 (noting records show Kansas City Chiefs employed Webster as
2008]
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The Board required Webster to be examined by a doctor of its
choosing, who subsequently reached the same conclusion as the
other doctors that had previously examined Webster. 7°
On November 5, 1999, the Plan awarded Webster Football De-
generative benefits. 7' Webster immediately appealed the deci-
sion.72 The Board denied his appeal on May 8, 2000, stating that
while Webster was now T&P disabled, he was not T&P disabled
'shortly after' his injury arose. 73 In July 2000, Webster again appealed
the Board's decision. To bolster this appeal, he submitted supple-
mental reports from three of the physicians that examined him, all
stating that Webster was T&P disabled at the time he retired from
football. 74 On March 17, 2003, the Board found that Webster had
been appropriately awarded Degenerative benefits and that he did
not become T&P disabled until September of 1996.75
Webster's estate filed a final appeal in April 2003.76 The Board
denied this last appeal stating that the medical opinions of the
three examining doctors were 'speculative and conclusory.' 77 Web-
strength and conditioning coach in 1994). Webster later described his employ-
ment with the Chief as follows, "[I had no] specific coaching duties but was there
supposedly to help out if necessary." Jani, 209 F. App'x at 308.
70. SeeJani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, No. Civ.
WDQ-04-1 606, 2005 WL 1115250, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2005) (summarizing med-
ical testimony of Dr. Edward Westbrook, physician selected by Board), affid, 209 F.
App'x 305 (4th Cir. 2006). Dr. Westbrook concluded Webster had been T&P dis-
abled as a result of multiple head injuries and that his disability started in March
1991 or earlier. See id.
71. See id. at *3 (awarding Degenerative benefits to Webster). A player who
last played in the league in 2003 would earn $110,000 per year under this type of
benefits. See NFL Players Association - Rules and Regulations - Player Benefits,
supra note 48 (providing example of annual disability payout for this category of
T&P disability).
72. See Jani, 2005 WL 1115250, at *3 (explaining Webster appealed Board's
initial decision and argued higher, Active benefits were appropriate). The Board
did not initially set an onset date for the T&P disability. See id.
73. See id. (explaining Board's reasoning for denial of appeal). The Board
interpreted Dr. Westbrook's report as stating that Webster's disability arose
"shortly after" he retired, but the Board did not think Webster became T&P dis-
abled at that time. See id.
74. See id. (describing Webster's second appeal). Webster included supple-
mental reports from Dr. Krieg, Dr. Himmelhoch and Dr. Westbrook. See id. The
Board also requested Social Security and Internal Revenue records. See id. at *4.
75. See id. at *4 (outlining reasoning behind Board's decision). The Board
stated that Webster became T&P disabled in 1996 based on a report by Dr. Marks,
an oncologist that had examined Webster. See id.
76. See id. at *4 (providing date of Webster's final appeal).
77. SeeJani, 2005 WL 1115250, at *4. (noting Board's final decision). The
Board stated that doctors Westbrook, Krieg, and Himmelhoch did not examine
Webster until 1998 or 1999, which were multiple years after Webster retired. See id.
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ster's estate promptly filed suit in federal court to appeal the
Board's final decision. 78
C. ERISA Litigation and Appropriate Standard of Review
ERISA allows an employee to file suit in federal court to re-
cover pension benefits. 79 The Plan falls within the scope of ERISA
because it is an employee pension benefit plan as defined by the
statute.8 0 This subsection examines the standard of review courts
employ when reviewing an ERISA case - an issue that is often liti-
gated and determinative in a case filed under this statute.81
1. Birth of the Standard of Review: Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Bruch82
The standard of review for courts reviewing ERISA complaints
is not included in the statute's text, but instead has evolved from
numerous court opinions including the Supreme Court's decision
in Firestone.83 Prior to Firestone, most circuits employed an arbitrary
78. See id. (providing filing date in district court of May 21, 2004). SunnyJani,
administrator of Webster's estate filed suit in the United States District Court of
Maryland. See id. at *1.
79. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2007) (listing available types of suits under ERISA).
Federal court is the proper venue for ERISA claims. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Da-
vila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004). To determine if a case arises under federal law, the
"well pleaded complaint" rule is used. See id. An exception to this rule occurs
when a federal statute, such as ERISA, completely displaces state law by pre-emp-
tion. See id. Then; a state claim can be removed to federal court. See id.
80. See Courson v. Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan, 75 F. Supp. 2d 424,
427 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (stating Plan is employee pension benefit plan and therefore
regulated by ERISA statute), affd, 214 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2000); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(2)(a) (2007) (defining employee pension benefit plan). "[A]ny plan,
fund, or program which.., is hereafter established or maintained by an employer
or by an employee organization .. .[and] (i) provides retirement income to em-
ployees, or (ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending
to the termination of covered employment or beyond . . . ." Id.
81. SeeJAIME RUTH EBENSTEIN & MARK E. SCHMIDTKE, ERISA LITIGATION PRI-
MER, Ch. 4, Section I (DRI 2004) (1992) (stating importance of standard of review
to ERISA claim). The standard of review dictates the amount of deference a court
will give to the fiduciary's decision and the scope of evidence the court may con-
sider. See id. Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (8th ed. 2004) (defining de
novo standard of review) with BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 11 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
abuse of discretion).
82. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
83. See EBENSTEIN & SCHMIDTKE, supra note 81 at Ch. 4, Section II (stating
prevailing standard of review among circuits before Firestone). ERISA does not
state the appropriate standard of review for civil actions brought under the statute.
See id.
20081
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and capricious standard when reviewing all benefits
determinations.8 4
In Firestone, the majority of the Court rejected application of an
arbitrary and capricious standard of review for all benefits determi-
nations, holding instead that de novo is the proper standard of re-
view "unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe the terms of the plan."85 The Court, however, did not
specify the type of contractual language that would give a plan ad-
ministrator this discretionary authority. 86 After Firestone, most Cir-
cuits abandoned the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in
favor of an abuse of discretion standard of review when the benefits
administrator has discretionary authority.87
2. The Board is a Fiduciary and Entitled to an Abuse of Discretion
Standard of Review
The Board is considered a fiduciary under ERISA.88 As a re-
sult, the appropriate standard of review for the Board's decisions
84. See id. (utilizing arbitrary and capricious standard before Firestone). Fed-
eral courts adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard of review based on simi-
lar language in the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). See id. Section
302(c) (5) of the LMRA discuses the duty of loyalty of trustees. See Struble v. New
Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 333 (3d Cir. 1984)
(highlighting similarities in language between LMRA and ERISA when defining
duty of loyalty for trustees).
85. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (restating Court's holding regarding appro-
priate standard of review for court's review of ERISA claims). This holding was
based on settled principles of trust law. See EBENSTEIN & SCHMIDTKE, supra note 81
at Ch. 4, Section II.
86. See EBENSTEIN & SCHMIDTKE, supra note 81 at Ch. 4, Section IV (noting
questions remained unanswered following Court's decision in Firestone). Circuits
will examine the power granting clauses and whether a board's decision is final
and binding to determine if board should be granted fiduciary status. See id.
87. Compare Smith v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 369 F.3d 412, 417 (4th Cir. 2004) (apply-
ing abuse of discretion standard of review), Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Em-
ployee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 310 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2002)
(applying abuse of discretion standard of review), and Layes v. Mead Corp., 132
F.3d 1246, 1250 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying abuse of discretion standard of review),
with Hullett v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 38 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir.
1994) (employing arbitrary and capricious standard of review). Many circuit
courts, including the Third Circuit in Hullett, have stated that the arbitrary and
capricious and abuse of discretion standards of review are similar, while other cir-
cuit courts have maintained the standards are not identical. See EBENSTEIN &
SCHMIDTKE, supra note 81 at Ch. 4, Section IV.
88. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(21)(a) (2007) (defining fiduciary). ERISA defines
a fiduciary as an entity that: (1) exercises discretionary control over management
of plan or management or disposition of plan assets, (2) renders investment advice
with respect to any money in the plan; and (3) has discretionary authority in the
administration of the plan. See id.
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after Firestone is an abuse of discretion standard. 89 Abuse of discre-
tion is a deferential standard of judicial review and reflects the
courts' hesitancy to interfere with decisions of a plan administrator
when it is considered to be a fiduciary. 90 Circuit courts will affirm
the decision of a fiduciary if "a reasonable person could have
reached a similar decision, . . . not that a reasonable person would
have reached that decision." 9'
A plan administrator's decision must be supported by substan-
tial evidence. 92 Further, it is not an abuse of discretion if a plan
administrator denies benefits when there is conflicting evidence
present.93 Nonetheless, the conflicting evidence on which the plan
administrator bases its decision must be substantial.94
89. See Johnson v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 468
F.3d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 2006) (utilizing abuse of discretion standard of review).
The Board has discretion in construing the terms of the Plan and determining
eligibility for benefits. See id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187,
supra note 12 (concluding abuse of discretion is proper standard of review for
fiduciaries). At least two NFL players have attempted to argue that a stricter stan-
dard of review should apply because the Board is operating under a conflict of
interest. See Johnson, 468 F.3d at 1086; see also Courson v. Bert Bell NFL Player
Retirement Plan, 75 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (W.D. Pa. 1999), affd, 214 F.3d 136 (3d
Cir. 2000) (arguing abuse of discretion standard of review is too deferential be-
cause Board acts under conflict of interest). The Firestone Court stated that if a
fiduciary is acting under a conflict of interest, the conflict must be weighed as a
factor when determining if there is an abuse of discretion. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at
115. In Johnson, the court dismissed the argument that a less deferential standard
of review should be used on the basis that the Board is neutral because its member-
ship includes an equal number of representatives chosen by players and manage-
ment and they must reach a majority decision. See Johnson, 468 F.3d at 1086.
Similarly, the court in Courson reached the conclusion that the Board does not
operate under a conflict of interest. See 75 F. Supp. 2d at 431 (finding no conflict
of interest because contributions to Plan are fixed and held by separate trustee,
and used solely for benefit of players or their beneficiaries).
90. See Johnson, 468 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246,
1250 (8th Cir. 1998)) (providing policy reason for deferential standard of review).
91. Id. (quoting Wise v. Kind & Knox Gelatin, Inc., 429 F.3d 1188, 1190 (8th
Cir. 2005)).
92. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (defining substantial
evidence). Substantial evidence is more than "a mere scintilla of evidence." Id.
However, it is less than the "weight of the evidence." Conosolo v. Fed. Mar.
Comm'n., 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
93. See, e.g., Elliott v. Sara Lee Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 606 (4th Cir. 1999) (stand-
ing for proposition that presence of conflicting evidence is not determinative in
review of fiduciary's decision).
94. See, e.g., Stup v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 390 F.3d 301, 308 (4th Cir.
2004) (reiterating proper basis of review when plan administrator has latitude to
interpret terms in plan); see also Stawls v. Califano, 596 F.2d 1209, 1212-13 (4th Cir.
1979) (finding lack of contemporaneous medical evidence is not dispositive for
dismissing benefits claim). Stawls filed for disabilities stemming from schizophre-
nia under the Social Security Act. See id. at 1210. The Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare denied Stawls benefits on the grounds that she could not prove
she was disabled as ofJune 30, 1962, the date she was last insured. See id. The basis
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D. Former NFL Players Challenging Board Decisions
Under ERISA Usually Lose
The majority of former NFL players who challenge the Board's
decisions in federal court lose either at the trial or appellate level. 95
The lack of success in federal court appears to be attributable to the
deferential standard of review given to Board decisions and the
presence of conflicting medical evidence.
9 6
1. Reversed At Appellate Level: Sweeney v. Bert Bell NFL Player
Retirement Plan97 & Williams v. Retirement Board of the Bert
Bell-Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan9 8
Walt Sweeney played in the NFL from 1963 to 1976 as a line-
man on the San Diego Chargers and Washington Redskins.9 9 Dur-
ing his playing career, Sweeney alleged that team doctors routinely
gave him pain killers, leading to his drug dependency disability in
1976.100 In addition, Sweeney alleged that a knee injury he suf-
for the Secretary's determination was the lack of any pre-1962 medical diagnosis of
Stawls' disability. See id. at 1212-13. There were, however, numerous medical re-
ports post-1962 that stated Stawls suffered from a mental disorder pre-1962. See id.
at 1213. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case stating the Secretary must weigh
the post-1962 medical reports in making a determination on whether Stawls was
entitled to benefits. See id. For a similar argument made by the Plan in Jani which
was also rejected by the Fourth Circuit, see infra notes 154-57 and accompanying
text.
95. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan,
468 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 2006); Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retire-
ment Plan, 410 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Retirement Board of the Bert
Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 61 F. App'x 362 (9th Cir. 2003);
Sweeney v. Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan, 156 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 1998);
Courson v. Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan, 75 F. Supp. 2d 424 (W.D. Pa.
1999), affid 214 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2000) (providing examples of NFL players who
sued Plan in federal court and were unsuccessful).
96. For a further discussion highlighting why decisions of the Board are re-
viewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review, see supra 88-94 and accom-
panying text. See generally, Boyd, 410 F.3d 1173 (providing example of court
weighing conflicting medical evidence regarding former NFL player).
97. 961 F. Supp. 1381, 1383 (S.D. Cal. 1997), affd in part, rev'd in part, 156
F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 1998).
98. 61 F. App'x 362 (9th Cir. 2003).
99. See Walt Sweeney Past Stats, Statistics, History, and Awards - databaseFoot-
ball.com, http://www.databasefootball.com/players/playerpage.htm?ilkid=
SWEENWALI01 (last visited Nov.13, 2007) (displaying Sweeney's regular season
statistics).
100. See Sweeney, 961 F. Supp. at 1385 (describing administration of drugs to
players). The San Diego Chargers gave Sweeney Dexedrine, an amphetamine, and
steroids starting in 1963. See id. In 1964, the team began giving its players
Desbutol, a combination upper and downer. See id. In 1970, the team issued
Desoxyn, pure speed, to its players. See id. When Sweeney complained to team
trainers that the amphetamines made him depressed, the staff recommended he
begin smoking marijuana. See id.
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fered in 1975 left him disabled.'0 1 Sweeney filed for disability bene-
fits from the league in 1989 and in 1993.102 After multiple
examinations, submission of additional evidence, and appeals, the
Board awarded Sweeney Inactive benefits and determined the year
of T&P disability to be 1990.'
Before the Board reached a final decision, Sweeney filed a suit
under ERISA in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California. 10 4 The district court ultimately held that the
Board abused its discretion in determining that Sweeney was not
T&P disabled from 1976 to the present, with the exception of the
period from 1984 to 1990.105 The court also determined that Swee-
ney was entitled to Active benefits during the time periods in which
he was T&P disabled. 10 6
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit ("Ninth Circuit") reversed in part and affirmed in part the
101. See id. (describing leg injury Sweeney suffered in final game of 1975 sea-
son). Although it appeared his leg healed during the off-season, Sweeney re-in-
jured the same leg during pre-season of the 1976 season. See id.
102. See id. at 1387 (noting 1989 application was without legal representation
and listed leg injury as sole reason for permanent disability). Sweeney's 1993 ap-
plication was with legal representation and while he still claimed the leg injury was
the cause of his disability he also submitted reports about his drug use and depen-
dency. See id. (providing differences between 1989 and 1993 applications). Also,
in 1993, the NFLPA and NFLMC negotiated a new collective bargaining agree-
ment which merged the old retirement plan with the current Plan. See Frazier v.
Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, No. 97-460-P-C, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21658, at *6 (D. Ala. Nov. 4, 1997).
103. See Sweeney, 961 F. Supp. at 1387-88 (summarizing disability application
and appeals process for Sweeney). The Board tabled Sweeney's application three
times before denying his claim in 1994. See id. at 1387. Sweeney appealed the
decision and submitted additional medical and employment records per the
Board's request. See id. In 1995, the Board made its final decision. See id. at 1388.
The Board awarded Sweeney Inactive benefits and set the start date of his T&P
disability at January 1, 1990. See id.
104. See id. at 1387 (chronicling Sweeney's early filing of ERISA suit). On July
28, 1994, Sweeney informed the Board of his intent to file an ERISA action. See id.
Sweeney did file an ERISA action in state court on August 12, 1994. See id. The
Board removed the case to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2002) (permitting
removal to district court in limited situations). The district court stayed Sweeney's
action until the Board had reached a final decision. See Sweeney, 961 F. Supp. at
1387.
105. See Sweeney, 961 F. Supp. at 1391 (restating district court holding). The
district court disagreed with the Board's conclusion that Sweeney was not T&P
disabled between 1984 and 1990, but stated that the Board did not abuse its discre-
tion in reaching this conclusion. See id. at 1393.
106. See id. at 1392 (supporting decision of Active benefits). The NFL teams'
training staffs that administered drugs to Sweeney committed an assault on him.
See id. "The causal connection between the injury and football is the basis for the
'Active Football' classification." Id.
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decision of the lower court. 10 7 The Ninth Circuit reviewed Swee-
ney's medical and employment records and held that the Board did
not abuse its discretion in determining that Sweeney was not T&P
disabled between 1977 and 1984.108 Moreover, it held that Swee-
ney's 1990 disability was not a relapse of his prior disability and,
therefore, he should have received Inactive benefits from 1990 to
the present instead of Active benefits. 10 9 Finally, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision that Sweeney was not T&P dis-
abled between 1984 and 1990.110
Similarly, in Williams, the Ninth Circuit reversed a decision of
the District Court for the Northern District of California to award
Delvin Williams $180,000 in disability. 1 1' Williams played in the
NFL from 1974 to 1981 as a running back for the San Francisco
49ers and the Miami Dolphins.11 2 In support of the reversal, the
Ninth Circuit found that Williams was able to perform "supervisory
employment," a condition rendering him ineligible for benefits. 113
107. See Sweeney v. Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan, 156 F.3d 1238 (9th
Cir. 1998) (announcing holding of Ninth Circuit).
108. See id. (detailing evidence Board relied on in making its determination).
For a further discussion of the no employment qualification for disability benefits,
see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
109. See Sweeney, 156 F.3d at 1238 (overruling district court's determination
that Sweeney suffered from one, continuous disability). The Ninth Circuit held
that the Board's determination that a T&P disability began as of January 1, 1990
was within its discretion. See id. Since Sweeney's injury arose more than twelve
years after the date of his retirement and after he turned forty-five, the Board was
correct to categorize Sweeney's benefits as Inactive under the terms of the Plan.
See id.
110. See id. (affirming portion of district court's decision). Evidence that
Sweeney earned over $20,000 in 1989 disqualified him from receiving benefits be-
tween 1984 and 1989. See id.
111. See Finder, Webster v. NFL, supra note 18 (discussing Plan's victory in
Ninth Circuit). Doug Ell argued successfully on behalf of the Plan to reverse the
lower court's decision to award Williams disability benefits. See id.
112. See Delvin Williams Statistics - pro-football-reference.com, http://www.
pro-football-reference.com/players/WillDeOl.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2007)
(providing information on William's NFL career).
113. See Williams v. Retirement Board of the Bert Bell/ Pete Rozelle NFL
Player Retirement Plan, 61 F. App'x 362, 362-63 (9th Cir. 2003) (determining Wil-
liams was capable of some types of employment). At issue was whether Williams
was able to engage in any type of employment, a necessary requirement for finding
a T&P disability. See id. Medical testimony established that Williams could engage
in "supervisory or other sedentary work," but could not engage in "'work which
involves any significant requirement for lifting, stooping, stretching, bending, pro-
longed standing, or walking"' Id. at 362-63 (quoting medical reports). Further,
there was evidence that Williams had worked as an executive for three different
employers. See id. The Ninth Circuit stated, "[a]ctual employment in sedentary
positions demonstrates employability[,]" and reversed the lower court's decision to
award Williams benefits. Id.
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2. Conflicting Evidence: Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players
Retirement Plan' 14
Boyd was a UCLA offensive lineman drafted in the third round
of the 1980 NFL draft by the Minnesota Vikings.'1 5 In a preseason
game during his rookie year, Boyd suffered a hit that left him mo-
mentarily unconscious and temporarily blind in his right eye; after
skipping a few plays, the Vikings staff ordered Boyd back into the
game.' 16 Boyd felt the initial effects of that hit in the form of head-
aches, dizziness, and memory loss, with his symptoms worsening af-
ter retiring from the NFL in 1986.117 In 2000, Boyd applied to the
NFL for disability benefits. While the Board awarded Boyd Inactive
benefits, it deferred consideration of his request for Degenerative
benefits. 118 Two Plan-neutral physicians examined Boyd and both
determined that Boyd was disabled from a "football-related activ-
ity."119 The Board, however, required Boyd to be examined by a
third physician, Dr. Gordon, who opined that the medical evidence
was inconclusive to determine the cause of Boyd's mental disabil-
ity. 120 Based on that testimony, the Board denied Boyd's request
for Degenerative benefits.1 2 1
114. 410 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2005).
115. See Barr & Berko, supra note 13 (describing Boyd's intellect and promise
in NFL). Boyd graduated with honors from UCLA, mastered every position on the
offensive line, and Vikings coaches initially praised his intellect. See id.
116. See id. (describing hit from preseason game at Orange Bowl). "The hit
itself I don't remember. I remember when I came to, I couldn't see out of my
right eye and I kind of panicked." Id.
117. See id. (describing Boyd's deteriorating mental condition). Boyd went
from being able to memorize the duties of every position on the offensive line to
struggling to remember teammates' names. See id. After retirement, Boyd's condi-
tion broke apart his marriage, led to increased drinking, and at times left him
homeless. See id. "Here he was someone with all the potential to accomplish any-
thing in the world and he couldn't manage a sales job because he would have to
pull to side [sic] of the road and fall asleep." Id. (quoting Boyd's therapist).
118. See Boyd, 410 F.3d at 1176 (providing Board's determination of Boyd's
application). Boyd listed "organic brain problems" - allegedly caused by the hit
in the preseason game - as the injury in his application for disability benefits. See
id. at 1175.
119. See id. at 1176-77 (discussing various medical examiners' opinions of
Boyd). Dr. Ford, a Plan-neutral physician, stated that Boyd's injury was a result of a
football-related activity. See id. at 1176. Another plan neutral physician, Dr. Radis-
avljevic reached the same conclusion. See id. at 1177. In addition, two other physi-
cians ran a brain scan on Boyd, at Boyd's request, and concluded he was disabled
due to a brain injury. See id.
120. See id. at 1177 (citing opinion of Dr. Gordon, third Board appointed
physician to examine Boyd). After two days of extensive testing, Dr. Gordon con-
cluded that Boyd's depression could not to a "reasonable degree of medical
probability" be caused by the hit in the preseason game. Id.
121. See id. (concluding Boyd's injuries did not "arise out of League football
activities"). The Board's decision to have Boyd examined by three Plan-neutral
2008]
19
Marks: One for Twenty-Five: The Federal Courts Reverse a Decision of the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
20 VILIANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Boyd filed suit in federal court under ERISA in the hopes of
still receiving disability benefits, but the district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Board. 122 On appeal, the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's decision. 123 In support of its
decision, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Board did not abuse its
discretion by relying on the sole medical testimony of Dr.
Gordon. 24 Further, the Ninth Circuit stated that ERISA litigation
is not a "mere exercise in expert poll-taking" and that a single physi-
cian's medical testimony may constitute substantial evidence.125
III. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
After Webster's estate filed suit in federal court, both sides
moved for summary judgment. The estate argued that Webster
should be eligible for Active benefits, as opposed to Degenerative
benefits, because every neurologist and psychologist that had ex-
amined Webster stated that he was T&P disabled as of the date he
retired from the NFL. 126 Conversely, the Board argued Webster
was not T&P injured "shortly after" he retired from the league be-
physicians led Boyd and others to question whether the Board was "doctor shop-
ping" for a favorable medical opinion. See Barr & Berko, supra note 13. In re-
sponse, Gene Upshaw, NFLPA Executive Director denied that the Board
participates in "doctor shopping." See id. (claiming NFLPA has nothing to do with
process of choosing examining doctors).
122. See Boyd, 410 F.3d 1178 (reiterating holding of district court).
123. See id. at 1179 (affirming district court).
124. See id. at 1178-79 (recounting analysis of Ninth Circuit). To find that the
Board abused its discretion, the Ninth Circuit stated that the record must lead to a
"definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. at 1178. The
Ninth Circuit then stated that a review of the record showed that the cause of
Boyd's injury was unclear. See id. at 1179. Boyd's disability was either caused by a
football-related activity or a non-football related activity. See id. Because there was
medical testimony to show that Boyd's disability may or may not have been caused
by a football-related injury, the Board did not abuse its discretion in deciding that
the disability was not a football-related injury. See id.
125. See id. ("We hold that a mere tally of experts is insufficient to demon-
strate ... [an abuse of discretion,] ... for even a single persuasive medical opinion
may constitute substantial evidence .... "). The Ninth Circuit also noted that even
the two physicians that had stated Boyd suffered injuries from playing football
were unable to conclusively state the cause of Boyd's injuries. See id. For example,
Dr. Ford stated Boyd was disabled as a result of a football injury, however, in his
detailed narrative stated, "[Boyd] does appear to have several problems that may
arise out of head injuries suffered in the course of his NFL career." Id. Dr. Ford
concluded that more testing would be required to determine the extent of those
injuries. See id.
126. For a further discussion of the differences between Active Benefits and
Degenerative Benefits, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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cause an oncologist who had been treating Webster since 1993 did
not identify any cognitive impairment until 1996.127
The district court began its review of the Board's decision with
a lengthy look at the background of the case. It reviewed all of the
medical evidence and summarized Webster's numerous interac-
tions with the Board.'12 Next, the district court stated that an abuse
of discretion standard of review applied in this case and then de-
fined and listed factors to be considered under this standard of
review. 129
Ultimately, the district court found that the Board had abused
its discretion in denying Webster Active benefits and, therefore,
granted summary judgment for Webster's estate. 30 The court
stated that every neurological specialist that had examined Webster
concluded he was T&P disabled by March 1991.131 Also, Webster
had submitted "volumes of evidence" supporting his position that
he had been T&P disabled since that date. 32
Further, the district court rejected the Board's argument that
the presence of conflicting medical evidence supported its decision
to deny Active Benefits and grant Degenerative benefits.1 33 Specifi-
cally, the conflicting evidence the Board relied on was not substan-
127. See Jani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 209 F.
App'x 305, 312 (4th Cir. 2006) (outlining Board's counterargument). The Board
based its argument on the testimony of Dr. Marks, a hematologist and oncologist,
who treated Webster for possible lymphoma starting in 1993. See id. at 310. After
several months of treatment from Dr. Marks, Webster showed signs of improve-
ment. See id. During a follow-up to the treatment in 1996, Dr. Marks stated Web-
ster's "life has really deteriorated recently" and that Webster exhibited signs of
depression - issues that were not present when he examined Webster in 1993. See
id.
128. See Jani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, No. Civ.
WDQ-04-1606, 2005 WL 1115250, at *24 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2005) (summarizing
examining doctors' medical opinions), affd, 209 F. App'x 305 (4th Cir. 2006).
129. See id. at *5 (adopting abuse of discretion standard of review from Booth
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 335, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2000)). In Booth, the Fourth
Circuit listed eight factors to guide a court in deciding whether a fiduciary abused
its discretion. See Booth, 201 F.3d at 34243.
130. SeeJani, 2005 WL 1115250, at *6 (repeating holding of district court).
131. See id. at 6. For a further discussion of the definition of the term "T&P
disabled," see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
132. SeeJani, 2005 WL 1115250, at *6 (listing evidence supporting Webster's
position). Webster submitted affidavits, Social Security records, and Internal Reve-
nue Service records stating he was unable to work since 1991. See id. In addition, a
private investigator, hired by the Board, interviewed Webster's business acquaint-
ances and friends and concluded Webster was unsuccessful in all of his business
ventures. See id.
133. See id. at *6 (rejecting conflicting medical testimony of Dr. Marks as
substantial).
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tial. 134 First, there was no evidence that the doctor whom the
Board relied on had ever examined Webster's neurological func-
tions before 1996.135 Second, the fact that an oncologist did not
notice Webster's mental condition prior to 1996 was insufficient evi-
dence in light of the overwhelming amount of evidence showing
the presence of Webster's mental disability at that time. 1 36 Because
of the lack of substantial conflicting evidence, the district court
held the Board could not justify its determination to award Webster
Degenerative Benefits.1
3 7
The Board appealed to the Fourth Circuit and made two argu-
ments in support of a reversal of the district court's decision. First,
the Board stated that Webster was, in fact, employed between 1991
and 1996 because of his broadcasting stint and job as the Kansas
City Chiefs strength and conditioning coach and his self-employ-
ment; evidence that would render him ineligible for benefits dur-
ing that time period.1 38 Second, the Board argued that several
doctors stated Webster was "generally in good health" during this
same period. 13 9 The Fourth Circuit found both of these arguments
unpersuasive and affirmed the district court's decision to grant
Webster's estate Active benefits.1 40
134. See id. For a further discussion of a case where a court agreed that the
conflicting evidence relied upon by the Board was substantial, see supra notes 114-
25 and accompanying text.
135. SeeJani, 2005 WL 1115250, at *6 (dismissing medical testimony of Dr.
Marks). Dr. Marks examined Webster for possible lymphoma in 1993. See id. at *4.
136. See id. at *6 (comparing Dr. Marks' medical testimony with testimony
from numerous neurologists and psychologists).
137. See id. (rejecting medical testimony of Dr. Marks as "substantial conflict-
ing evidence").
138. SeeJani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 209 F.
App'x 305, 315 (4th Cir. 2006) (arguing Webster was not T&P disabled at begin-
ning of his retirement). For a further discussion of the definition of T&P disabled
and specifically the requirement that a player be "substantially unable to engage in
any occupation or employment for remuneration of profit," see supra notes 51-52
and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit classified Webster's broadcasting stint
as a failed audition and stated his job with the Kansas City Chiefs fell within the
exception outlined in the Plan regarding certain types of employment given out of
benevolence. SeeJani, 209 F. App'x at 315.
139. SeeJani, 209 F. App'x. at 316 (favoring testimony from examining psy-
chologists and neurologists). The Fourth Circuit explained that the doctors who
remarked Webster was "generally in good health" were not qualified to comment
on his mental health. See id. Similar to the district court, the Fourth Circuit was
not persuaded by the medical testimony of Dr. Marks. See id.
140. See id. (questioning Board's decision to ignore medical evidence from its
own expert). The Board stated that it accepted Dr. Westbrook's determination
that Webster was T&P disabled, however, chose not to accept Dr. Westbrook's de-
termination of when Webster became T&P disabled. See id. at 316 n.7 (noting
unreasonableness of Board's parsing of Dr. Westbrook's opinions). In defense of
its position, the Plan argued that it often utilizes Plan-neutral physicians only to
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IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Jani affirming the district
court's determination that the Board had abused its discretion rep-
resents the first defeat for the Board at the appellate level in pen-
sion litigation under ERISA.14' The decision was also a major
victory for Webster's family: part of the estimated $1.5 million
award will be used to recover Webster's four Super Bowl rings
which are being held as collateral by a defense attorney.1 42
A legal analysis of the holding inJani, however, reveals that it is
fairly narrow and questions what, if any, precedence it will have for
other players challenging the Board in federal court.143
The holding is narrow because of the specific facts of Webster's
case; there was unanimous relevant medical evidence that Webster
was T&P disabled.' 44 This fact was embodied in the court's holding
which stated that the Board, as a fiduciary, abuses its discretion
when it ignores unanimous medical evidence. 145 Although a fiduci-
ary can rely on conflicting evidence -as long as the evidence is sub-
determine whether a player is disabled and not to determine when a player be-
came disabled. See id. at 317 n.8. The Fourth Circuit rejected this position stating
that in eight other cases involving brain injuries, the Board accepted a Plan-neu-
tral's determination of whether a player was T&P disabled as well as the onset date.
See id. (explaining record belied Board's claim); see also Donovan v. Eaton Corp.,
Long Term Disability Plan, 462 F.3d 321, 329 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding factually
similar decision by fiduciary to be abuse of discretion). In Donovan, the Fourth
Circuit held that a fiduciary abuses its discretion if it credits a doctor's earlier,
incomplete testimony and then discredits the same doctor's later, comprehensive
opinion. See id.
141. See Garber, Family, Friends React, supra note 15 (quoting Cyril Smith, one
attorney that argued for Webster's estate: "[t]his is the first time an appeals court
has so emphatically - or ever - rejected the NFL's denial of these types of bene-
fits"). It is estimated that the award to Webster's estate could be close to $2 mil-
lion. See id.
142. See id. (reporting extent of award against NFL). The NFL was required
to pay medical bills and attorney fees. See id. The remainder of the award will be
split amongst Webster's ex-wife, four children and Jani. See id.
143. For a further discussion of the narrow holding of the Jani case, see infra
notes 144-48 and accompanying text. But see, Garber, Family, Friends React, supra
note 15 ("There is now an avenue of redress to be properly compensated, just like
any other workplace in this country. These players give their body and souls for
this job. Now, there's some hope for people with these injuries and disabilities.")
Id. (quoting one attorney for Webster's estate, Robert Fitzsimmons).
144. See generally Jani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan,
No. Civ. WDQ-04-1606, 2005 WL 1115250, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2005) (accepting
unanimous medical testimony of neurologists and psychologists who examined
Webster), affd, 209 F. App'x 305 (4th Cir. 2006).
145. See Garber, Family, Friends React, supra note 15 (reporting thoughts of
NFL spokesman, Greg Aiello). Mr. Aiello downplayed the decision stating it was a
"narrow issue." See id.
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stantial- it cannot ignore unanimous relevant evidence. 146 This
principle appears to be well settled and the Fourth Circuit cited to
numerous opinions reaching an identical conclusion. 147 Almost al-
ways, however, a court reviewing a Board's decision will be
presented with conflicting medical evidence about a former
player's medical history. 148 Therefore, Jani may be of little assis-
tance to players challenging a Board's decision in federal court
when conflicting medical evidence is present.
Conversely, the opinion may assist players filing in court be-
cause it does limit the type of medical evidence the Board can rely
on as substantial evidence. 149 In past cases such as Boyd, courts have
upheld a decision of the Board founded on the lone medical testi-
mony of an examining physician.150 In Jani, the Board made a simi-
lar argument, using the medical testimony of Drs. Marks and Conn
to demonstrate that Webster's health did not begin to really deteri-
orate until years after he retired. 15' Both courts questioned and
rejected the testimony of these doctors.15 2 One concern was
whether either doctor was qualified to comment on Webster's neu-
rological functions and the other concern was whether Dr. Marks
had ever examined Webster's neurological functions before
146. See Milburn Colliery Co. v. Hicks, 138 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998) (out-
lining Fourth Circuit's handling of unanimous medical evidence to prove total
disability under disability plan with similar language). A miner can establish a "to-
tally disabling respiratory condition" under the Black Lung Benefits Act with unan-
imous medical evidence showing the miner suffers that condition. See id. Further,
if contrary medical evidence exists, then it must be weighed against the evidence
establishing the miner has a "totally disabling respiratory condition." See id.
147. SeeJani v. The Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 209 F.
App'x 305, 314-15 (4th Cir. 2006) (recounting Fourth Circuit jurisprudence re-
garding unanimous medical evidence in benefits determination litigation).
148. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Retirement Plan, 410
F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2005) (presenting case where conflicting medical evidence was
present).
149. For a further discussion of two limitations imposed on a fiduciary when
faced with conflicting medical evidence, see infra notes 153-57 and accompanying
text.
150. See Boyd, 410 F.3d at 1179 (reasoning Board did not abuse discretion).
The Board relied on the medical testimony of Dr. Gordon. See id. at 1177. Boyd
claims much of Dr. Gordon's examination was actually preformed "by an ill-pre-
pared graduate student." See Barr & Berko supra note 13 (describing Boyd's claim
that Board "doctor shopped" until it could get contrary opinion).
151. See Jani, 209 F. App'x at 310 (summarizing medical opinions of Drs.
Marks and Conn). Dr. Conn performed an echocardiogram on Webster in 1994.
See id.
152. See id. at 316 (rejecting medical testimony of Drs. Marks and Conn). The
Fourth Circuit stated neither doctor was asked or qualified to comment on Web-
ster's mental health. See id.
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1996.153 Further, the Fourth Circuit attacked the Board's decision
to disregard the medical opinion of the Plan-neutral physician. 154
Specifically, the Fourth Circuit stated the Board could not rely on
the doctor's earlier, incomplete evaluation and then ignore the
same doctor's later, complete evaluation. 55 In addition, the Board
must not only accept the Plan-neutral physician's diagnosis, but
must also accept the onset date determined by that physician. 156
Therefore, while determining disability benefits may not simply be
an "exercise in expert poll-taking," the Jani court did identify some
restrictions for the type of medical evidence which qualifies as sub-
stantial evidence. 15 7
Finally, the Jani opinion is unpublished and therefore, despite
giving players some guidance in what constitutes substantial evi-
dence, there may be little, if any, real precedential value.' 58 This
case does have value, however, outside the legal realm. Webster's
court victory has given hope to other players having similar griev-
ances with the Board and has attracted additional attention to the
increasingly public dispute between former players and the NFL.159
153. SeeJani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, No. Civ.
WDQ-04-1606, 2005 WL 1115250, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2005) (questioning
whether Dr. Marks previously examined Webster's neurological functions), affd,
209 F. App'x 305 (4th Cir. 2006). Further, Dr. Conn reported Webster was "capa-
ble of most physical activities that would be relevant to his age." SeeJani, 209 F.
App'x at 310. There was no evidence, however, that Dr. Conn examined Webster's
neurological functions. See id. at 316.
154. SeeJani, 209 F. App'x at 316 (questioning Board as to why it disregarded
its own expert).
155. See id. at 314 (citing Donovan v. Eaton Corp., Long Term Disability Plan,
462 F.3d 321, 329 (4th Cir. 2006) (reconciling situation where one physician exam-
ines patient multiple times). A fiduciary will abuse its discretion when it relies on a
doctor's earlier, incomplete evaluation of a patient, but dismisses the same doc-
tor's later, complete evaluation of the same patient. See id.
156. See id. at 317 n.8 (citing evidence that Board relies on Plan-neutral physi-
cian for determination of onset date of disability).
157. See id. at 316-17 (outlining situations where reliance on conflicting medi-
cal testimony is not substantial evidence). The Board requested that the court
disregard the testimony of its own medical examiner. See id. at 316. The reason
the Board gave for not relying on its own medical examiner's observations is that
the examiner's observations were not made at the time of Webster's retirement.
See id. The Fourth Circuit declined to adopt the position that lack of contempora-
neous medical evidence is substantial evidence to disqualify a player from being
eligible for benefits. See id. at 316-17.
158. See 4TH Cm. R. 36(b) (explaining Fourth Circuit's treatment of unpub-
lished opinions). Rules of the Fourth Circuit disfavor citation to unpublished
opinions except when counsel finds an unpublished opinion applicable to a case
and there is not an applicable published opinion. See id.
159. See Garber, Family, Friends React, supra note 15 (illustrating hope Web-
ster's victory has given to other players in similar situations). Webster's son, Gar-
rett stated he received numerous emails from other retired players who are
fighting the NFL for better benefits. See id.
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V. IMPACT
Tension has grown between retired players and the NFLPA
over whether the league has adequately compensated retired play-
ers that are injured. 60 Recently, some former players and coaches,
such as Mike Ditka, took their frustrations with the league and the
NFLPA before a House of Representatives subcommittee to illus-
trate why, in their opinion, the NFL undercompensates or even ig-
nores injured, retired players.1 61 The NFL and NFLPA countered
that disability benefits have been increased in recent years and ad-
mitted that it will be impossible to please every former player who is
injured because in a contact sport such as football, the league must
draw lines between injuries that are compensable and injuries that
are not compensable. 62 This section examines both sides of the
debate and concludes that one way to improve disability benefits for
former players is to get current players involved. 163
A. Former Players: The NFL Has Forgotten Us
Many former players believe the NFL has ignored them and
their injuries.' 64 Their main grievance is that the Board rarely clas-
sifies an injured player as disabled. 65 Empirical evidence appears
160. See Finder, NFL's Disability Plan, supra note 30 (espousing sentiments of
many ex-players). "The plan is an area of contention for many former players, who
utter . . . the same criticism: Off a roster, out of mind." Id.
161. See Alan Schwarz, Congress Scolds NFL. and Union, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2007, at D5 [hereinafter Schwarz, Congress] (summarizing June 26, 2007 hearing
before House subcommittee). Players including Boyd, Marsh and Harry Carson as
well as Webster's lawyer detailed their grievances with the Board during a two hour
hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Commercial and Adminis-
trative Law. See id.
162. See id. (quoting portions of testimony from Doug Ell and Dennis Curran,
NFL senior vice president). Ell stated, "Gene [Upshaw's] very frustrated because it
seems like no matter what he does, he can't satisfy the players." Id.
163. See id. (listing other proposed remedies offered by subcommittee). Pos-
sible legislative remedies, expedited arbitration and permitting former players in-
creased involvement in benefits administration were all mentioned by the
subcommittee as possibilities to fix the current situation. See id.
164. See Ken Murray, The NFL's Forgotten Players, BALT. SUN July 2, 2006 at ID
(noting entire generation of NFL players feel abandoned by league); see also,
Schwarz, Concussions, supra note 44 (referring to physical and psychological effects
of concussions). Brent Boyd testified before the House subcommittee: "[t]he NFL
is trying to distance themselves from liability for all the carnage left behind by our
N.F.L. concussions -just as tobacco companies fought like hell to deny the links
between smoking and cancer." Id.
165. See Garber, Family, Friends React, supra note 15 (stating Webster's son
maintained his father's lawsuit in part because of encouragement from other for-
mer players). Garrett Webster, Mike Webster's son, states cynicism among former
players is high with many of them asking "if you had to die or fall into a coma to
get this benefit." Id.
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to support this assertion: of the 3,500 retired players represented,
less than one-percent qualify for full disability. 166 Players often cite
the NFL's authority to define an injury as the reason why so few
players receive benefits. 67 An additional criticism is that the
NFLPA "doctor shops" until it finds a doctor who will testify that a
player was not injured by playing football and then the Board will
use that doctor's testimony as evidence to deny a player disability
benefits. ' 68
Even former players that do receive disability benefits are often
unhappy with the NFLPA and the Board. Benefits for a perma-
nently injured player average $63,000 annually, an inadequate
amount according to many former players. 169 Other players who
receive benefits complain that the NFL continues to scrutinize
them to determine if they still qualify for benefits. 170 For example,
Curt Marsh, an offensive guard on the Oakland Raiders' 1983
Super Bowl team, suffered a career-ending ankle injury in 1987 and
eventually had his right leg amputated. 17 1 Marsh qualified for disa-
bility benefits, but says the Plan still requires him to be examined
every year to see if he is still disabled. 172
Recently, Congress and the Fourth Circuit have joined former
NFL players in questioning and criticizing the league's administra-
tion of disability benefits. A House of Representatives subcommit-
tee hearing in June 2007 resulted in heavy criticism of the Board
166. See Lopez, supra note 16 (quoting survey results from 2005 Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette study). The study concluded that only 130 former players earn full
disabilities from the league. See id. In comparison, a survey of thirty attorneys that
represent players in disability cases estimated that fifty to sixty-five percent of re-
tired players have suffered a permanent injury. See Logan, supra note 29 (sug-
gesting large disparity between number of injured former players and number of
former players receiving benefits).
167. See Garber, Family, Friends React, supra note 15 (criticizing NFL's power to
define disabilities); see also Sweeney v. Bert Bell NFL Retirement Plan, 961 F. Supp.
1381, 1384 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (explaining Plan gives Board authority to interpret all
terms in Plan), affd in part, rev'd in part, 156 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 1998).
168. See Barr & Berko, supra note 13 (expressing Boyd's criticism of Board's
alleged practice). Boyd argues that an unprepared graduate student, in large part,
conducted the third medical examination. See id. The Board relied on this medi-
cal examination to make its decision on his benefits. See id.
169. See Schwarz, Congress, supra note 161 (calling current benefit amounts
"pitiful"). The Plan pays roughly $20 million in benefits to 317 retirees. See id.
170. See Finder, NFL's Disability Plan, supra note 30 (requiring players receiv-
ing disability to be reevaluated by doctor to confirm disability still exists).
171. See id. (noting injuries of Marsh). In addition to his leg being ampu-
tated, Marsh had his hip replaced, several lower-back surgeries, a plate inserted
into his neck and screws in his arms. See id.
172. See id. ("Every year, they have you go in - every single year - to have the
doctor look at you to see if you're still disabled[.]"). Marsh jokes that every year he
is examined by a doctor to see if his leg has grown back. See id.
2008]
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from both Republicans and Democrats. 173 Similarly, the Fourth
Circuit found the Board abused its discretion when it overlooked
unanimous medical evidence to deny Webster a higher category of
benefits. 174
B. The Board: " [T] he Plan does a very good deal. It pays out a
lot of money in disability benefits to players."1 75
In response to the mounting criticism, the NFLPA states that as
a fiduciary it cannot simply award disability benefits to every retired
player that is injured from playing football. 176 The NFLPA also
points out that in recent years it has made efforts to improve bene-
fits for retired players. For example, the 1993 collective bargaining
agreements instituted a new category of disabilities and monthly
pension benefits were increased for pre-1977 players in 2006.177
Further, two new sections which will improve benefits were added
to the 2006 Amended Collective Bargaining Agreement.1 7 8
173. See Schwarz, Congress, supra note 161 (reporting subcommittee's reaction
to testimonies). It was apparent that the subcommittee members sided with the
former players, offering that they would consider legislative remedies. See id.
174. See Garber, Family, Fiends React, supra note 15 (reporting holding of
Fourth Circuit). Onejudge on the three-judge panel that heard the appeal even
stated the Plan's conduct "'indicates culpable conduct, if not bad faith."' See
Schwarz, Congress, supra note 161.
175. Finder, Webster v. NFL, supra note 18. (quoting Doug Ell, lawyer and
representative of Plan). Further, Greg Aiello touts the generosity of the Plan,
stating "I think you would find in business it's rare for companies to reach back
and improve benefits for former employees." See Ron Kroichick, Glory has its Price:
The 1981 49ers Benefits Battle, S.F. CHRON.,Jan. 21, 2007, at D1I (providing NFLPA's
response to criticisms about benefits for former players).
176. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (B) (2007) (defining "prudent man standard
of care" for fiduciary). A fiduciary shall act "with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enter-
prise of a like character and with like aims[.]" Id.
177. For a thorough description of the history and shortfalls of the NFL Pen-
sion plan, see HISTORY OF RETIREMENT AND T&P BENEFITS FOR NFL PLAYERS, supra
note 46. Despite the increases, the NFL's pension pays less than what Major
League Baseball's pension plan pays to its retired players. See Lopez, supra note 16
(comparing NFL pension to pensions of other major sports).
178. See Article XLVIII-D, 88 Benefit, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN THE NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND THE NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION (2006),
http://www.nflpa.org/pdfs/Agents/CBA Amended 2006.pdf (establishing 88
Benefit and potential NFL Players Benefit Committee). The 88 Benefit, which be-
came effective on February 1, 2007, provides additional assistance to players suf-
fering from dementia. See id. (detailing new type of benefit available to former
players). In addition, the proposed NFL Player Benefits Committee would provide
services that are currently performed by the Plan's office located in Baltimore,
Maryland. See NFL Player Benefits Committee, http://www.nflpa.org/cba/cba
pdf/ARTICLEXLVIII-ENFLPlayersBenefitsCommittee.pdf (last visited Nov.
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The NFLPA also defends the Board's actions by maintaining
that it is a neutral decision-making body.' 7 9 First, the composition
of the Board promotes neutrality; of the six person Board, three
members are selected by NFL management and three members are
selected by the players. 180 Second, decisions of the Board must be
unanimous. If the Board is deadlocked, the issue is submitted to a
MAP whose opinion is binding on the Board.' 8 ' Regarding the
Board's decision on Webster's benefits, NFL spokesman Greg
Aiello stated that all six members had a different view of the situa-
tion but did reach a unanimous decision.182 In addition, he stated
that the Board didn't deny Webster benefits, it just didn't award
him the highest level of benefits. 183
13, 2007) (proposing additional improvement to current process for administering
benefits).
179. See Sweeney v. Bert Bell NFL Retirement Plan, 961 F. Supp. 1381, 1384
(S.D. Cal. 1997) (detailing composition of Board), affd in part, rev'd in part, 156
F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 1998). Retired players have requested that they be given a
representative on the Board, but requests have been brushed aside. See Lopez,
supra note 16 (voicing former players' grievance about lack of representation on
Board).
180. See Sweeney, 961 F. Supp. at 1384 (showing equal appointees by NFLPA
and NFLMC ensure neutrality in determining disability awards). Although retired
players are unable to nominate someone to sit on the Board, they have been told
by Gene Upshaw that he is their voice. But see Lopez, supra note 16 (noting Up-
shaw has reportedly stated that he does not represent retired players).
181. SeeJohnson v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 468
F.3d 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing provision in Plan to alleviate deadlocked
decisions of Board). If the Board cannot reach a majority decision, the Plan pro-
vides for a MAP to examine the player. See id. The Board is then bound by the
MAP's determination of whether a player is T&P disabled, but the Eighth Circuit
determined that the Board is not bound to the date a MAP sets as the T&P disabil-
ity start date. See id. at 1086. Two reasons were given to support this position: (1) a
MAP may not be able to determine the start date for when a player is T&P disabled
because other information may be required such as employment records and (2)
the report the MAP creates does not provide a space for listing the onset date of a
player's T&P disability. See id. But seeJani v. Bert Bell/ Pete Rozelle NFL Player
Retirement Plan, 209 F. App'x 305, 317 n.8 (4th Cir. 2006) (reaching opposite
conclusion that Board has followed MAP's onset date for T&P injury in other
cases).
182. See Garber, Family, Friends React, supra note 15 (providing Aiello's
thoughts on case). For a further discussion of the Board's rulings regarding Web-
ster's disabilities, see supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
183. See Garber, Family, Friends React, supra note 15 (quoting Gene Upshaw)
("We all feel badly for what happened to Mike Webster, but obviously there are a
lot of players who go through similar circumstances .... [Y]oujust don't award a
benefit to someone who is going through a tough time. That's not how it works.").
20081
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VI. CONCLUSION
NFL players from Mike Webster's generation are frustrated be-
cause they feel neglected by the NFL. 184 Adding to these players'
frustration is the inability to challenge decisions of the Board in
court because of the current Plan's language and the statutory limi-
tations under ERISA.185 One solution which would not be sub-
jected to these judicial restraints would be to renegotiate the terms
of the Plan. 1 6 This solution, however, would ultimately require co-
operation from current players.
The current Plan is in large part a product of the 1993 collec-
tive bargaining agreement between the NFLPA and the NFLMC. 18 7
Neither party, however, represents retired players. Gene Upshaw,
the head of the NFLPA, has repeatedly and emphatically stated that
the NFLPA only represents current players.' 88 While current play-
ers have received numerous benefits through collective bargaining,
similar benefits have notably been less forthcoming for retired play-
ers. 189 Therefore, the ability to improve benefits for retired players
184. See Lopez, supra note 16 (highlighting current success of NFL). Forbes
magazine has valued NFL franchises at an average of $820 million a piece. See id.
The NFL is a $6 billion a year industry with television and multimedia contracts
estimated to generate $24 billion over the next eight years. See id.
185. See Sweeney v. Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan, 961 F. Supp. 1381,
1390 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (outlining appropriate standard of review), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 156 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 1998). The Board has "discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits .... The abuse of discretion standard is thus the
appropriate standard of review .... " Id.
186. See Article XLVII, Retirement Plan, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND THE NFL P.AvERs ASSOCIATION
(2006), supra note 178 at 135 (incorporating Plan into 2006 Collective Bargaining
Agreement).
187. See id. at preamble (2006) (providing example of draft of 2006 collective
bargaining agreement). The Preamble lists all of the entities that the NFLPA
represents:
1. All professional football players employed by a member club of the
National Football League;
2. All professional football players who have been previously employed by
a member club of the National Football League who are seeking employ-
ment with an NFL Club;
3. All rookie players once they are selected in the current year's NFL
College Draft; and
4. All undrafted rookie players once they commence negotiation with an
NFL Club concerning employment as a player.
Id.
188. See Lopez, supra note 16 (highlighting former players' frustrations with
NFLPA and Gene Upshaw specifically). The mission statement of the NFLPA in-
cludes the statement, "We pay homage to our predecessors for their courage, sacri-
fice and vision." Id. But see Murray, supra note 164 (suggesting principles of labor
law only permit NFLPA to represent current players, not former players).
189. See Lopez, supra note 16 (listing improvements in benefits for current
NFL players). The recent collective bargaining talks have given current players
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may ultimately fall into the hands of current players. This prompts
many former players, such as Art Kuehn, to encourage current play-
ers to take responsibility "to take care of the ones who came before
you."190
VII. POSTSCRIPT
As the 2007 NFL season kicked off in early September, the
NFLPA was in the midst of a campaign to combat the mounting
public criticism it had received over its handling of disability bene-
fits for former players. 191 On the offensive side, the NFLPA an-
nounced a four-point program in July 2007 to improve benefits for
former players. 192 Further, the NFLPA launched a website dedi-
cated to defending itself by separating fact from fiction regarding
the disability process as well as the interactions between the Board
and former players such as Webster and Boyd.' 93 Current players
have also agreed to help, voluntarily giving up $147.5 million in
salary to assist former players.194 Finally, and perhaps most signifi-
401 (k) plans, annuities, and better benefits. See id. But see Murray, supra note 164
(evidencing benefits have improved for former players at expense of current play-
ers). In 2002, benefits doubled for players who were in the NFL before 1968. See
id. Their benefits doubled, from $100 to $200 per month for every credited sea-
son. See id. This increase of $110 million came out of current player benefits. See
id.
190. Greg Bishop, Pension Tension Players Split on Benefit Amount, SEArrLE
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006 at C7, available at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/
cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=pension 18&date=20061218&query=
pension+tension (quoting former NFL player). Bruce Laird, former Indianapo-
lis Colts safety hopes to improve dialogue between current and former players. See
Murray, supra note 164. Laird states that the dialogue is "virtually nonexistent." Id.
191. See, e.g., The NFLPA Truth Squad: Facts vs. Fiction, http://www.nflpa.
org/truth/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (providing forum for NFLPA to explain their
side of story regarding current benefits controversy).
192. See Press Release, NFLPA, NFLPA and NFL Announce New Retirement
Benefits Initiatives (July 25, 2007), http://www.nflpa.org/pdfs/NewsAndEvents/
MediaReleases/Meeting-with RetiredPlayersjuly25.pdf (announcing NFLPA's
latest improvements of benefits for former players). The four-point program es-
tablished a retired player's medical fund and a cardiovascular health program for
former players. See id. In addition, the NFLPA stated it is committed to improving
and expediting the disability procedures and is exploring post-retirement health
insurance options for players. See id. A highlight of the retired player's medical
fund is that it will use $7 million to provide free joint replacement surgery for
former players. See id.
193. See The NFLPA Truth Squad: Facts vs. Fiction, supra note 191 (providing
forum for NFLPA to rebut "misinformation" from former players and media). The
site also provides links to Gene Upshaw's September 2007 Senate testimony,
NFLPA press releases, and information relating to Boyd's interactions with the
Board including the federal court opinions and Dr. Gordon's medical report. See
id.
194. See Press Release, NFLPA, NFL Players Association Chief Gene Upshaw
Cites "Dramatically Improved Pension and Disability Benefits" Since 1993 for Re-
2008]
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candy, in the bitter feud between some former players and the
NFLPA, it appears that a middle ground may be attainable. At a
September 18, 2007 hearing before a Senate subcommittee, Gene
Upshaw began by defending the NFLPA and the Board, but then
asked Congress for help in improving the benefits process. 95
Therefore, while former players and the NFLPA may disagree on
just how broken the current benefits system is, it appears both par-
ties are willing to improve the process. 196
Derek Marks*
tired Players in Senate Testimony (Sept. 18, 2007), http://www.nflpa.org/Truth/
pdfs/Sept.l8 PressRelease.pdf (highlighting every active player reduced his sal-
ary by $82,000).
195. See GENE UPsHAw TESTIMONY FOR SENATE (Sept. 18, 2007) http://www.
nflpa.org/Truth/pdfs/Gcne-Upshaw Tesfimony for SenateSept.18.PDF (tran-
scribing Upshaw's testimony before Senate Subcommittee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation). Upshaw used the majority of his testimony to list the numer-
ous improvements the NFLPA has instituted to its disability system. See id. He
concluded by asking Congress to help by making legislative changes to existing
labor law. See id. Comments from senators present at the hearing, however, sug-
gest Congress is not interested in getting involved in the situation. See Lester Mun-
son, Ex-Players, League Officials Find Common Ground, ESPN.coM, Sept. 18, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=munsonlester&id=
3026092 (quoting Senator John Kerry) ("I hope we never have to act and set up
some sort of accountability .... People must wonder why we are even in this. My
hope is the league will act.").
196. See Munson, supra note 195 (suggesting NFLPA and former players both
agree benefits system can be improved).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, Villanova University School of Law; B.S.B.A.,
2002, American University.
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